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A Capabilities-Based Approach to Force Planning

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Capabilities-Based Approach to Force Planning

- Study sponsored by the Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Views, opinions, and findings are those of LMI



Disconnect of Supply and Demand

Supply

Forces that can win a conventional war with peer

Lengthy buildup of massed firepower

Deliberate reliance on reserves for major operations (USA, USAF)

Develop better versions of legacy platforms/systems

vs.

Demand

Prevail in a wide range of current and future conflicts (1-4-2-1)

10-30-30

Shared info and knowledge


Support recurring, extended deployments

Transform the joint force

Overuse of selected capabilities; underuse of others



Demand Signals – PPBE Process



- Strategic guidance: mix of abstract concepts and fiscally unrealistic programming instruction
 - COCOMs focused on near term programs
- Program build: driven by Service priorities
 - Emphasis on recapitalizing legacy force structure
- Program review: OSD reveals which part of the guidance they really meant
 - Services “defend the program”
- Execution: “did we spend the money?”
 - Little feedback vis-à-vis strategic objectives



Demand Signals -- DoD Analysis Process

Study Phases

Determine
Objective

Define
Scenario(s),
Assumptions,
CONOPS

Select Tools,
Define/Collect
Data

Conduct Analysis

Generate Results

Traditional Analyses

- Focused on gaps vs. specific threat
- Threat and Service roles and CONOPs carefully scoped
- Attrition oriented
- C4ISR, strategic log/mob separate
- Dials or assumptions for everything else
- Base case in-depth, very limited excursions
- Add firepower to win
- Incremental changes to planned programs



Are We Really Doing Capabilities-Based Planning*?

Determine
Objective

**Looking for adaptive options
that hedge against a wide
range of possible futures?**

Define
Scenario(s),
Assumptions,
CONOPS

**Focused on sensitivity
to myriad variations in
key assumptions?**

Select Tools,
Define/Collect
Data

**Addressing big trades or
marginal changes?**

Conduct Analysis

**Supporting choice
making or advocating
programs?**

Generate Results

*Heavily based on
work by Paul Davis,
Rand Corp



End State

- DoD leadership, not the stovepipes, make key risk judgments
 - Avoid serial sub-optimization at the stovepipe level
- DoD's planning process is strategy-driven
 - In the context of an unknowable future
- DoD components' analytic and programming activities respond to the corporate planning guidance
 - Analytic activities geared to informing, achieving, changing corporate priorities
 - Assess gaps *and* excesses, benefits *and* costs



Capabilities Approach

1. Identify first order capabilities--what must be accomplished to meet strategic objectives
 - Break the “lesser included” mold
2. Assess the demand for these capabilities across a broad security context
 - Inform relative priorities at the strategic level
3. Identify key trade areas to satisfy unmet demands
 - Still open to a variety of programmatic solutions
4. Devise options to provide needed capabilities—now and as demands change



Strategic Level Capabilities

- Deter adversaries/reduce the need for military intervention
- Shape conflicts to terms advantageous to the U.S.
- Identify, locate, and defeat non-conventional forces/resources
- Protect citizens and infrastructure
- Provide humanitarian assistance/restore essential services
- Restore self-sufficiency in nations and non-state areas
- Identify, locate, and defeat conventional military forces



Strategic Level Capabilities

Primary force sizing
mechanisms today



- Deter adversaries/reduce the need for military intervention
- Shape conflicts to terms advantageous to the U.S.
- Identify, locate, and defeat non-conventional forces/resources
- Protect citizens and infrastructure
- Provide humanitarian assistance/restore essential services
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Proposed Security Context

- **Multi-Polarity (RAND)**

- Current allies/friends become or coalesce around one or more near-peers
- Highly stressing, but where we are already strong

**Conventional
threat from
advanced
state(s)**

- **Game Changer (OFT)**

- Determined exploitation of U.S weaknesses/ dependencies, possibly via technical breakthrough
- Threat of surprise development that renders part/all of our military might ineffective

**Any state or non-state
actor setting new
rules of warfare**

- **Core vs. Gap (Barnett)**

- Isolated authoritarian regimes export terror, drugs, pandemics, radicalism
- Multiples of Iraq, Afghanistan—major post-conflict operations

**Non-advanced states
threatening global
stability**

- **Intra-Regional Bullies with WMD (OSD)**

- Must deter use of WMD, deal with possible WMD aftermath
- Sources of proliferation

Global “911” force

- **HLS-Centric**

- Threat of frequent, synchronized assaults on CONUS

**Major areas of US
become more like
Jerusalem**



Demand for Strategic Capabilities (*Illustrative*)

Strategic Level Capabilities	Security Context				
	Multi-Polarity	Game Changer	Core vs. Gap	Intra-Regional Bullies	HLS
Deter adversaries/ reduce need for military intervention	H	H	L	H	H
Identify, locate, defeat conventional military forces	H	L	L	M	L
Shape conflicts to terms advantageous to US	M	H	L	H	H
Identify, locate, defeat non-conventional military forces	L	H	H	L	H
Protect citizens and infrastructure	L	H	M	M	H
Provide humanitarian assistance/restore services	L	L	H	M	H
Restore self- sufficiency	L	L	H	M	L

Means very different things
across scenario range

Highly sensitive to expanded
range of conflicts




H=Higher Demand
M=Medium Demand
L=Lower Demand



Demand for Strategic Capabilities— Compared to Force “Supply” (*Illustrative*)

Strategic Level Capabilities	Security Context				
	Multi-Polarity	Game Changer	Core vs. Gap	Intra-Regional Bullies	HLS
Deter adversaries/ reduce need for military intervention	H	H	L	H	H
Identify, locate, defeat conventional military forces	H	L	L	M	L
Shape conflicts to terms advantageous to US	H	H	L	H	H
Identify, locate, defeat non-conventional military forces	L	H	H	L	H
Protect citizens and infrastructure	L	H	M	M	H
Provide humanitarian assistance/restore services	L	L	H	M	H
Restore self- sufficiency	L	L	H	M	L

Need to explore many variations within “boxes”

-  Higher priority for investment
-  Medium priority for investment
-  Lower priority for investment






Demand for Strategic Capabilities— Implications for Force Mix

Strategic Level Capabilities	Security Context				
	Multi-Polarity	Game Changer	Core vs. Gap	Intra-Regional Bullies	HLS
Deter adversaries/ reduce need for military intervention	H	H	L	H	H
Identify, locate, defeat conventional military forces	H	L	L	M	L
Shape conflicts to terms advantageous to US	H	H	L	H	H
Identify, locate, defeat non-conventional military forces	L	H	H	L	H
Protect citizens and infrastructure	L	H	M	M	H
Provide humanitarian assistance/restore services	L	L	H	M	H
Restore self- sufficiency	L	L	H	M	L

To turn these reds and yellows to green, need more/better/different functions such as:

- C4ISR
- Cyber and unconventional technology
- Special operations
- Perception management/cultural intelligence
- Restoration of essential services
- Security
- Limited governance

-  Higher priority for investment
-  Medium priority for investment
-  Lower priority for investment



Summary

- Strong corporate level direction essential
 - Connect strategy and the program, drive major trades
- Must separate formulation of needs from solutions
 - Free ourselves from platform centric analysis
- Recent capabilities-based efforts show progress, but are “mild-hybrids” at best
 - Primacy of campaign models limits exploration
 - Strong program advocacy impedes choice making

